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BIAS AND THE LOUDERMILL HEARING: DUE PROCESS OR
LIP SERVICE TO FEDERAL LAW?
INTRODUCTION

In Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,' the Supreme Court
held that a public employee who holds a constitutionally protected interest 2 in his job must be granted a hearing before being terminated.' This
requirement protects the employee from erroneous discharge and is derived from the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution.4
While Loudermill held that a pretermination hearing was required, 5
the Court did not prescribe specific requirements for the hearing. Instead, the Court described the hearing generally as "an opportunity to
respond," 6 and concluded that "something less" than a full evidentiary
hearing would suffice.7 The specific purpose of the hearing is to provide
an initial check against erroneous termination by allowing the employee
to respond to the charges before losing his source of income.8 The facts
in Loudermilldid not involve biased decisionmakers and the majority did
not reach the question whether a biased9 decisionmaker1° may conduct
the pretermination hearing.
Since Loudermill, courts have disagreed whether and to what extent
personal bias may invalidate a pretermination hearing. This disagreement is confounded by the fact that some forms of bias are not prejudicial, while others are inherently unfair and thus offend due process.11 In
cases where the decisionmaker harbors malice toward the employee or
1. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
2. See infra notes 36-46 and accompanying text.
3. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 545-46.
4. See U.S. Const. amend. V ("No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law"); U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law").
5. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46.
6. Id. at 546.
7. Id. at 545 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976)).
8. See infra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
9. Bias is the tendency to rule against the employee because of a conflict of interest.
Professor Tribe has categorized conflicts as institutional and personal. See L. Tribe,
American Constitutional Law § 10-16, at 745 (2d ed. 1988); infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
10. The decisionmaker is the official responsible for discharging the employee. See
Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1007 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 1535
(1989). He is usually a supervisor or other administrator of the agency for which the
employee works. See, eag., Page v. DeLaune, 837 F.2d 233, 235-36 (5th Cir. 1988) (supervisor); Matthews v. Harney County School Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 890 (9th Cir. 1987)
(school board); Washington v. Kirksey, 811 F.2d 561, 562-63 (11th Cir.) (school superintendent), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 96 (1987); Brown v. Texas A & M Univ., 804 F.2d 327,
329 (5th Cir. 1986) (university administrator); Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1255-56
(4th Cir. 1985) (hospital administrator); Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 829 (1st Cir.
1985) (town manager).
11. See infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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has a personal or financial stake in the termination, the protections afforded by a fair hearing are lost.12 The employee is denied a meaningful
opportunity to respond to factual determinations because the outcome
reflects the decisionmaker's own bias. 13 Moreover, a personally biased
decisionmaker is unlikely to exercise any discretion in favor of the employee; once termination takes effect, the employer is unlikely to reverse
itself. 14
Some courts have recognized the unfairness of hearings conducted by
such decisionmakers.15 However, other courts have held that bias is not
a factor at all in determining the validity of the hearing. These courts
ignore the purpose of the pretermination hearing and rely on post-termination process to remedy the bias present in the earlier hearing.16
Part I of this Note discusses procedural due process and the right of
public employees to a pretermination hearing. Part II examines the due
process right to an impartial decisionmaker and the kinds of bias permitted in due process hearings. Part III analyzes Loudermill's pretermination hearing requirement and argues for the removal of personal bias
from these hearings. This Note concludes that personal bias defeats the
purpose of pretermination hearings and thereby violates due process.
I.

DUE PROCESS AND THE PUBLIC EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO A
PRETERMINATION HEARING

A.

ProceduralDue Process

The due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments 17 pro12. See infra notes 100-102 and accompanying text.
13. See Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1010 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
14. See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Matthews v. Harney County School Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 893 (9th
Cir. 1987) (pretermination hearing before school board that had already decided to terminate employee violated due process); Washington v. Kirksey, 811 F.2d 561, 564 (11th
Cir.) (due process violated when decisionmaker failed to honor agreement made at
pretermination hearing), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 96 (1987); Rosario Torres v. Hernandez
Colon, 672 F. Supp. 639, 652-53 (D.P.R. 1987) (politically biased pretermination hearing
violated due process); Cook v. Board of Educ., 671 F. Supp. 1110, 1116 (S.D.W. Va.
1987) (employee permitted to prove lack of impartial decisionmaker); Salisbury v. Housing Auth., 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1441 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (personal involvement in termination
process rendered housing authority members so biased that they could not conduct
pretermination hearing).
16. See, e.g., Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1008 (full post-termination hearing serves to ferret out bias by the employer); Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 716 (5th Cir.
1987) (allegations of bias and conspiracy do not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982)).
17. Due process rights arise from the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The fifth
amendment applies to actions by the federal government, see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332 (1976), and the fourteenth amendment applies to actions by state and local
governments, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 255-56 (1970). The Supreme Court
has interpreted the guarantees of both amendments to provide equal safeguards and has
used the term "due process" to include rights under either amendment. See Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542-46 (1985) (discussing due process cases
under both amendments without distinction); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164
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hibit federal and state governments from depriving individuals of "liberty, or property, without due process of law."18 This is a procedural
right to "some kind of hearing"" that arises when the government deprives an individual of a constitutionally protected liberty or property
interest.2 0 This hearing must occur "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."2 The essence of this right
"reflects a fundamental value
22
in our American constitutional system."
As a general rule, due process requires that the hearing occur before
the deprivation takes effect. 23 Exceptions arise only when a state interest

of "overriding significance" 24 justifies postponing the hearing until after
the deprivation occurs. 25 In public employment cases, due process requires some form of hearing before termination 2combined
with a full evi6
dentiary hearing after termination takes effect.

The Supreme Court has developed a two-step analysis to determine
whether hearings are required and, if so, the formal requirements and
timing of the hearings. First, the interest being deprived must rise to a
constitutional dimension; unless the interest meets this threshold, due
process is not implicated and no hearing is required.27 Second, when a
protected interest does exist, the Court applies a balancing test to determine the form of hearing required. 2 The balancing test considers three
factors in determining what process is due: the private interest affected
(1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("constitutional guarantee of procedural due process depends ...on the presence of a legitimate 'property' or 'liberty' interest within the meaning of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment").
18. U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see also H. Perritt, Employee
Dismissal Law and Practice § 6.9, at 336 (2d ed. 1987) (discussion of due process rights
of public employees).
19. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
20. See id.
21. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
22. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
23. See id. at 379.
24. Id. at 377.
25. See id. at 379.
26. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985); infra
notes 47-58 and accompanying text.
27. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972) (court must first determine whether the interest at stake is within the constitutional protection of liberty or
property). In applying this analysis, the Supreme Court has recognized various governmental entitlements as property interests protected under the due process clause. See,
e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976) (Social Security disability benefits);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 & n.8 (1970) (welfare benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963) (unemployment compensation). See generally Reich, The
New Property, 73 Yale L.J. 733 (1964) (discussing various forms of government entitlements). The Court has also found property interests in licenses required for revenue
producing activities. See, e.g., Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1979) (horse trainer's
license); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971) (driver's license); Willner v. Committee
on Character and Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102 (1963) (admission to thd bar); Goldsmith v.
United States Bd. of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117, 123 (1926) (accountant's license); Dent
v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 121-22 (1889) (physician's license).
28. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 570; Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263.

1096

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

by the deprivation; the risk of erroneous deprivation and the value of
additional or substitute procedures; and the government's interest, including the function involved and the burden of additional or substitute
procedures.2 9
Application of the balancing test in different contexts has resulted in a
range of procedural requirements. For example, welfare recipients are
30
entitled to a full evidentiary hearing before the state terminates benefits,
3
while disability recipients are not entitled to a prior hearing. I This dichotomy exists because erroneous termination would cut off the eligible
welfare recipients' only means of support, 32 while most disability recipients can rely on alternative economic sources. 3 3 In addition, welfare recipients are not likely to be able to articulate in writing their qualification
for benefits,3 4 while decisions concerning eligibility for disability depend
upon objective medical reports which eliminate the need for further
pretermination inquiry."
B. Public Employment
Termination from public employment involves both property3 6 and
liberty 37 interests. 38 A property interest exists when the employee possesses a legitimate claim of entitlement to continued employment. 39 This
claim may arise under statute, 4° contract, 4 1 tenure42 or other employ29. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35; infra note 48 and accompanying text.

30. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264, 266-71.
31. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
32. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 264. Welfare provides the means to obtain basic needs;
without independent sources, the recipient's situation becomes desperate. See id. These
private interests, combined with the state's interest in providing subsistence to the poor,
outweigh the government's interest in preserving the public fisc. See id. at 264-66.
33. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 342-43. For example, disabled workers may derive financial assistance from several other sources, "such as earnings of other family members,
workmen's compensation awards, tort claims awards, savings, private insurance, public
or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, public assistance," or other programs. Id. at 341 (footnote omitted).
34. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 269.
35. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 344, 349.
36. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972); H. Perritt, supra note
18, § 6.10, at 337-41.
37. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 572-75; H. Perritt, supra note 18, § 6.11, at 341-46.
38. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
39. See id.
40. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985) (statutory
entitlement to continued employment "during good behavior and efficient service")
(quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.34).
The property interest in federal employment is governed by federal statute. See Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 164-67 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (discussion of federal
statute prohibiting discharge except for cause). In Arnett, the plurality concluded that
the statute granting a right to continued employment could constitutionally circumscribe
the employee's due process rights at termination. Thus, a statute granting a property
right could prescribe the process due the employee prior to discharge. See id. at 154. The
Loudermil Court rejected this rationale and held that once a statute creates a property
interest in continued employment, the Constitution determines what process is due. See
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ment relationships.4 3 The liberty interest is implicated when discharge
jeopardizes the employee's "good name, reputation, honor, or integrity." 44 The stigma caused by such charges can foreclose or seriously
inhibit the employee's ability to secure other employment.4 5 When discharge affects either of these interests, the employer must provide 46
minimum procedural safeguards guaranteed by the due process clause.
The Loudermill Court held that where discharge of public employees
triggers due process protection, a hearing is required before termination
takes effect. 47 Like recipients of welfare and disability, the employee's
interest is in uninterrupted income, while the government's interest is in
the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory or disruptive employees and in
keeping citizens gainfully employed.4 ' Employment termination also deLoudermill, 470 U.S. at 541; L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-12, at 706-14. Thus, the
Loudermill Court separated the constitutional due process requirements from the property interest in continued employment.
41. See Board of Regents v. Updegraff, 205 Okla. 301, 302, 237 P.2d 131, 134-35
(1951), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
42. See Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 554-55 (1956).
43. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972) (de facto tenure arising
from officially promulgated rules and understandings); Connell v. Higginbotham, 305 F.
Supp. 445, 448-49 (M.D. Fla. 1969) (clearly implied promise of continued employment),
aff'd per curiam, 403 U.S. 207 (1971). See generally H. Perritt, supra note 18, § 6.10, at
337-41 (discussing employment relationships).
44. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972) (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971)).
45. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976); Roth, 408 U.S. at 573-74; see also
Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 898 (1961).
Deprivation of the liberty interest requires publication; absent publication, the employee's interest in his reputation is not affected. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348
(1976); cf Kendall v. Board of Educ., 627 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1980) (school board deprived teacher's liberty rights by maintaining inaccurate personnel file because it was
most likely that the file would be given to prospective employers). Liberty interests also
include "First Amendment rights... and penumbralrights of privacy." H. Perritt, supra
note 18, § 6.11, at 342 (emphasis in original).
46. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 & n.3 (1985).
47. See id. at 547-48. The pretermination hearing is part of an overall due process
scheme that includes a full hearing at some point in the termination process. Specifically,
the Loudermill Court held that even when a full hearing is provided after termination,
the employee is still entitled to an abbreviated hearing before discharge takes effect. See
id. at 546-48. Accordingly, absent post-termination process, the employee is entitled to a
full hearing before termination. See Salisbury v. Housing Auth., 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1442
n.7 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
48. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542-44. The employer has an equal interest in avoiding costs associated with additional procedures and erroneous discharge. However, affording the employee a fair pretermination hearing does not impose a "significant
administrative burden [or] intolerable delays," id. at 544, and the employee continues to
provide services until discharge takes effect, see id. Where the decisionmaker is impermissibly biased, the official normally responsible for the termination decision "need only
recuse and transfer the file to a person qualified to make the initial decision." See Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 199 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). But see id. at 170-71 n.5 (Powell, J., concurring) (disqualification would increasingly complicate removal).
In some situations, disqualification may present the problem that no qualified decisionmaker exists within the agency. See, e.g., Brasslett v. Cota, 761 F.2d 827, 837 (Ist
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prives a person of his livelihood,4 9 but the Court distinguished welfare.5
Whereas welfare represents the recipient's last source of financial support,5 ' a discharged employee can secure employment elsewhere.5 2 In
addition, the suspension with pay pending the pretermination hearing is
a less drastic alternative to immediate discharge. Accordingly,
the
53
pretermination hearing need not be a full evidentiary proceeding.
The purpose of the hearing is twofold. Because dismissal for cause
often involves factual disputes,5 4 the hearing provides an opportunity to
refute or explain inaccurate factual conclusions which may have led to
the employee's predicament. 5 The hearing also provides the "only
meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker,' ' 6
and thus reaches beyond the facts underlying the termination decision.5 7
"It should be an initial check against mistaken decisions--essentially, a
determination that
the charges against the employee are true and support
58

[termination]."
II.

THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL DECISIONMAKER

The Supreme Court has stressed the need for an unbiased decisionmaker whenever a hearing is required.59 Examination of bias claims
Cir. 1985) (town manager issued both initial and final decisions to discharged fire chief).
In such cases, the pretermination hearing can be conducted by a separate body, such as a
personnel appeals board. See id. at 830.
49. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
50. See id. at 545 (distinguishing Goldberg v. Kelly).
51. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (unlike public employment, termination of welfare "may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live"
(emphasis in original)).
52. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543-45. Although the worker may find employment
elsewhere, doing so will take time, and questionable circumstances surrounding his discharge will likely hamper the subsequent job search. See id. at 543.
53. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545.
54. See id.
55. See id. Conversely, reliance on objective medical reports submitted by the disability recipient's own physician reduces the risk of erroneous factual conclusions and obviates the need to explain factual conclusions. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344
(1976).
56. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543.
57. See id. The need for an opportunity to explain the facts was apparent in
Loudermill. One of the employees in that case had been terminated for lying about his
criminal record on his employment application, and not on the objective fact that he was
a convicted felon. The Court noted that the employee's explanation for the misstatement
was plausible because he had received only a suspended six month sentence. See id. at
544 n.9.
The second employee in Loudermill had a stronger case for a pretermination hearing
because he was eventually reinstated. A bus mechanic who had failed an eye examination, the employee might have avoided discharge by presenting evidence that at least one
other employee had been retained despite failing the same examination. See Loudermill
v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 721 F.2d 550, 562 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
58. Id. at 545-46.
59. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955); L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-16, at
744-45; Friendly, Some Kind ofHearing, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1267, 1279 (1975).
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generally begins with the basic requirement of neutrality6 ° in the judicial
forum and the limited toleration of bias in certain non-judicial settings.6 1
In some cases, due process violations occur in the mere appearance of
bias,62 while in others the Court has noted potential due process violations even when partiality was not an issue.6 3 Thus, impartiality is an
underlying concern in all due process cases.
Bias claims fall into the categories of "personal" and "institutional"
conflicts of interest." Personal conflicts arise when the decisionmaker
has a personal or finanpial stake in the outcome of the issue being decided.65 Personal bias can also take the form of a "personal spleen" or
personal grievance.66 Personal bias is always impermissible.
In contrast, institutional bias occurs when the decisionmaker is a
member of an administrative agency that performs a dual function of
investigation and adjudication.6 7 The Court is more tolerant of bias in
this category, and affords the decisionmaker a presumption of honesty
and integrity.6" For example, the Court has found no due process violation when a legislative enactment bestows investigative and adjudicative
60. See L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-16, at 744-45.
61. See infra notes 67-74 and accompanying text.
62. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972). In Morrissey, the Court
found that a parole officer need not be presumed to be biased: "It would... be unfair to
assume that the parole officer bears hostility against the parolee that destroys his neutrality .... " Id. at 485-86 & n.13 (citing Note, Observationson the Administration of Parole,
79 Yale L.J. 698, 704-06 (1970)) (noting that parole officers act as social workers rather
than "adjunct[s] of the police"). Nonetheless, the Court held that a decision to revoke
parole must be made by a person not directly involved in the case. See Morrissey, 408
U.S. at 486; see also Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice").
63. See, e.g., Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 579 n.2 (1968) ("we do not
propose to blind ourselves" to obvious defects present where the school board performs a
dual function).
64. L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-16, at 745.
65. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 197 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (disputes should not be adjudicated by persons with substantial
personal or financial interest in the outcome); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S.
57 (1972) (mayor not permitted to adjudicate traffic offenses where town received proceeds of fines); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (prohibiting town from reimbursing mayor for acting as judge in prohibition cases where court costs assessed against
convicted defendants); see also L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-16, at 745 (discussing due
process impartiality requirements).
66. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954); see also Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,
400 U.S. 455, 463-65 (1971) (where contempt citation for vilifying trial judge is handed
down after trial, due process requires a public hearing before a judge other than the judge
so vilified); L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-16, at 746 & n.6.
67. See, e.g., Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (state examining board that
investigates professional misconduct and disciplines physicians); Morrissey v. Brewer,
408 U.S. 471, 475 (1972) (investigation and determination of parole violation performed
by parole board); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 408-09 (1971) (investigation and
hearings concerning eligibility for Social Security benefits performed within same
agency). See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.5, at 353-61 (2d ed.
1980) (discussing cases upholding dual function); L. Tribe, supra note 9, § 10-16, at 74549 (discussing due process claims against dual role in government agencies).
68. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975).
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duties upon a federal or state agency.69 In such cases, the Court upholds

the dual role, deferring to the legislative wisdom in vesting both func-

tions in the same agency.7 ° Where the decisionmaker does not possess a
personal or financial stake in the outcome,
his association with the
71
agency usually does not offend due process.
Cases validating the dual role, however, have involved agencies that
routinely conduct administrative hearings.7 2 While the dual role within
the same agency does not ordinarily offend due process, different considerations arise when the individual decisionmaker reviews his own decision. 73 For example, a welfare official who participates in the
determination that a recipient no longer qualifies for benefits may not
preside over that recipient's hearing.74 In such a case, a decisionmaker
who has made a decision before the hearing is less likely to reverse himself.75 Accordingly, while due process allows an agency to perform a
dual function, an individual within that agency may not.
III.

BIAS AND THE PRETERMINATION HEARING

Despite the requirement for an impartial decisionmaker, some courts
have taken the position that bias is not a due process violation at the
pretermination hearing. For example, in Duchesne v. Williams,7 6 the
Sixth Circuit concluded that even a meaningless pretermination hearing
would not offend due process. In such cases, post-termination process
would "ferret out bias, pretext, deception and corruption by the employer in discharging the employee.", 77 However, this reasoning ignores
69. See, e.g., Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426
U.S. 482, 495-96 (1976); Withrow, 421 U.S. at 55. Hortonville involved a school board's
dual role of negotiating collective bargaining contracts with its teachers and deciding how
to deal with illegal strikes. See Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 487, 495-96. Despite the board's
involvement in the contract dispute that led to the strike, see id. at 484-85, the Court
upheld the hearings as an exercise of the board's statutory policymaking authority, see id.
at 497. By permitting the board to decide whether to terminate striking teachers, the
Court preserved the Board's control over school affairs, and assured that the decision was
made by the body responsible for that decision under state law. See id. at 496.
In Withrow, a statute empowered a state medical board to investigate complaints
against physicians and to suspend their licenses. Upholding this dual role, the Court
deferred to the legislative wisdom in vesting both functions in the same agency. See
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 52.
70. See Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 497; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 46-52 & n.16.
71. See Hortonville, 426 U.S. at 491-94; Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47.
72. See Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47-50.
73. See id. at 58 n.25.
74. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970); see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (independent decisionmaker required in probation revocation hearing); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (same requirement applies to parole
revocation hearings).
75. See generally 3 K. Davis, supra note 67, § 19.4, at 382-89 (disqualification based
on prejudgment of adjudicative facts); infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
76. 849 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989).
77. Id. at 1008; see also Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1987).
Duchesne involved the termination of a chief building inspector who had criticized the
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78
the two-fold purpose of the pretermination hearing.

A. Arnett v. Kennedy Revisited
Courts that do not consider bias to be a due process violation in
pretermination hearings improperly rely on Loudermill to validate such
hearings. 79 Loudermill held that due process requires a "pretermination
opportunity to respond, coupled with [a] post-termination [hearing]," 80
but the Court did not reach the bias issue."1 Some of the Justices would
have made bias a factor, especially when facts are disputed,82 but the
majority simply could not agree on specific requirements. This conclusion finds additional support in Arnett v. Kennedy,8 3 an earlier employment termination case that involved a significant bias issue.8 4
In Arnett, the plurality avoided the bias issue by concluding that the
terminated employee had no right to a pretermination hearing. However, Justice White, concurring in part and dissenting in part, opined that
a biased decisionmaker would have violated due process. 85 He recognized that although fairness and accuracy were not always threatened
when an employee's supervisor acts as decisionmaker, some situations
present a risk of bias "too great to tolerate." 86 For example, individuals
city manager for approving payments for work that did not conform to specifications.
See 849 F.2d at 1005. The city manager decided to terminate the inspector, then conducted the pretermination himself. See id. Despite the manager's personal involvement
in the termination process, see id. at 1011 (Ryan, J., dissenting), the court found no due
process violation. See id. at 1008.
78. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1008; Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709,
716 (5th Cir. 1987).
80. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 547-48 (1985).
81. See Salisbury v. Housing Auth., 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1442 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
82. Justice Brennan concluded that when facts are disputed, the employee may deserve a fair opportunity to produce contrary evidence or to confront his accuser before
the decisionmaker. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 553 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). Justice Marshall would have held that before a decision is made to
terminate an employee's wages, the employee is entitled to an opportunity to confront
and cross-examine the witnesses against him. See id. at 548 (Marshall, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment); Kendall v. Board of Educ., 627 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir.
1980).

83. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
84. In Arnett, a representative of the federal Office of Economic Opportunity was
charged with publicly accusing his regional director of bribery without proof. See id. at
136-37 (plurality opinion). The regional director terminated the representative without a
prior hearing pursuant to federal statute. See id. at 136-38. The plurality concluded that
the representative had no right to a pretermination hearing and thus avoided the bias
issue presented by the director's involvement in the employee's bribery claims. See id. at
153-55.
85. See id. at 199 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White
observed that the regional director, as a hearing officer, would have made a decision in
which his own reputation was at stake. See id.
86. Id. at 199 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White
began with the principle that "[N]o man shall be a judge in his own cause." Id. at 197
(quoting Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114a, 118a, 77 Eng. Rep. 646, 652 (K.B. 1610)). He then
noted that impartiality was required in welfare and parole revocation hearings. See id. at
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with substantial pecuniary interests in legal proceedings should not adjudicate those proceedings. 87 Writing for the Loudermill majority, Justice
White 88did not modify the concern for impartiality he expressed in
Arnett.
Some of the other Justices in Loudermill preferred to make bias a factor, but could not agree on a standard. Justice Brennan, concurring with
the majority on the pretermination hearing issue, concluded that when
facts are disputed, the employee may deserve a fair opportunity to produce contrary evidence or to confront his accuser before the decisionmaker s9 Similarly, Justice Marshall, also concurring, repeated his
belief that before a decision is made to terminate wages, the employee is
entitled to confront and cross examine the witnesses against him.90
Thus, some of the Justices in Loudermill expressed concern for bias
either by requiring an evidentiary hearing before discharging the employee or by disqualifying decisionmakers who are personally biased.
In light of the Justices' concern for impartiality when facts are in dispute, reliance on Loudermill for the proposition that a pretermination
hearing satisfies due process even if the decisionmaker is personally biased is misplaced. Rather, the opinions in Loudermill and Arnett suggest
the contrary.
B. Bias Defeats the Purpose of the Loudermill Hearing
The purpose of the pretermination hearing is to provide an "initial
check" against erroneous discharge. 9 While a post-termination hearing
reviews the merits of the termination, it cannot cure defects in the
pretermination hearing itself.9" When impermissible bias infects the
198 (citing Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1974) (termination of welfare benefits);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972) (revocation of parole)). Justice White
concluded that the same requirement of impartiality applied in employment termination
cases. See 416 U.S. at 199.
87. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 197 (citing Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57
(1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927)).
88. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985) (citing Arnett,
416 U.S. at 170-71 (Powell, J., concurring in part)). The facts in Loudermill did not
present a bias issue and Justice White simply did not address the issue. See Salisbury v.
Housing Auth., 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1442 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
89. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 553. This conclusion is consistent with his dissenting
opinion in Arnett, where he joined Justices Marshall and Douglas in concluding that the
employee is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before an impartial, independent decisionmaker. See Arnett, 416 U.S. at 215-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 548 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment) (citing Arnett, 416 U.S. at 214 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
91. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545; Matthews v. Harney County School Dist. No. 4,
819 F.2d 889, 892 (9th Cir. 1987).
92. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970). In Goldberg, the Court noted
that the sole purpose of the pretermination hearing in the welfare context is to produce an
initial determination of the validity of terminating welfare benefits. See id. Arguably, a
hearing held by the official who investigated the recipient's case would not be cured by a
post-termination hearing. See id. at 271 (decisionmaker should not have participated in
the determination under review). The damage sought to be avoided through the
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pretermination
hearing, it becomes a "sham process paying lip service to
'93
federal law."

In examining the validity of pretermination hearings, courts should
focus on the decisionmaker's involvement in the discharge process and
determine whether the employee was afforded a fair hearing. 94 A common problem is the decisionmaker's familiarity with the employee's case.
While a decisionmaker is generally familiar with the facts in dispute, his
decision to terminate should not be made before the hearing. 95 Such a
prior determination renders the hearing meaningless. 96 The hearing is
also suspect when a decisionmaker's prior public statements commit him
to a position beforehand. 97 In these situations, the employee's right to a
meaningful hearing is lost.
Pretermination hearings conducted by individuals who have investigated the employee's case have also been held invalid.9" A grievance procedure that requires an employee to appear before administrators who
have investigated his case is inherently unfair, regardless of the existence
of post-termination relief in state court. 99 As an investigator, the decisionmaker will have already reached a factual determination before the
hearing. Where the employee disputes the facts, the decisionmaker's predisposition against the employee's version of the facts renders the hearing
meaningless.
Personal animosity also renders a pretermination hearing meaningless.

Dismissal for cause can involve "fabrications born of personal antagopretermination hearing will have already occurred. See Id. at 266 (stakes too high and
possibility of error too great to allow termination without prior hearing).
93. Rosario Torres v. Hernandez Colon, 672 F. Supp. 639, 652 (D.P.R. 1987).
94. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 199 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Justice White concluded that a pretermination hearing conducted by the employee's supervisor did not violate due processperse. However, individual cases may present a due process violation created by the supervisor's involvement in
the employee's case. See id. In such cases, courts should examine the circumstances and
determine whether such a violation has occurred.
95. See, e.g., Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 & n.8; Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1
v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 488-97 (1976). In Loudermill, the Court noted
that the employer's discretion would be more informed and the risk of error "substantially reduced." 470 U.S. at 543-44 n.8 (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84
(1975)). However, the decisionmaker's prior knowledge should be limited merely to being informed of factual disputes, without having already made his own determination.
See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 n.8.
96. For example, a pretermination hearing held by a school board after it has made
an irrevocable decision against the employee may very well be invalid. See Matthews v.
Harney County School Dist. No. 4, 819 F.2d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 1987). In that case, the
court reversed the district court's summary judgment in the employer's favor because a
jury could find such a hearing meaningless. See id. at 893-94.
97. For example, hearings conducted by school board members, whose firm public
statements concerning "hotly contested" issues have committed them to deciding against
the employee, do not meet the due process demand for fairness. See Staton v. Mayes, 552
F.2d 908, 914 & n.11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 907 (1977) (distinguishing
Hortonville, where the facts were not in dispute).
98. See Kendall v. Board of Educ., 627 F.2d 1, 5 (6th Cir. 1980).
99. See id.
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nisms" that may undermine the accuracy of factual determinations. °°
This form of bias occurs where the employee's public criticism of his
employer leads to dismissal. 10 1 In these situations, the decisionmaker's
bias can so taint the pretermination hearing that due process guarantees
become illusory.1" 2
In rejecting bias claims, courts have cited the existence of a post-termination hearing as an adequate remedy.'0 3 These courts reason that the
post-termination hearing serves to "ferret out bias" in the pretermination
hearing." ° However, this reasoning ignores the procedural protection
compromised by the decisionmaker's bias. Where the decisionmaker is
impermissibly biased against the employee, both the initial review of factual conclusions and the opportunity to invoke the employer's discretion
are lost. 105 Consequently, the employee
is discharged without the protec10 6
tion of a fair Loudermill hearing.
100. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 214 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
101. See, e.g., id. at 199 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (hearing
examiner was target of slander that led to employee's discharge; examiner's own reputation was at stake); Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1243 (4th Cir. 1985) (state hospital
employees alleged that their public complaints about hospital management led to their
dismissal); Salisbury v. Housing Auth., 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1436 (E.D. Ky. 1985) (employee claimed discharge was in retaliation for public criticism of her employer).
102. See Salisbury, 615 F. Supp. at 1442. An extreme case occurred in Rosario Torres
v. Hernandez Colon, 672 F. Supp. 639 (D.P.R. 1987), where political bias rendered the
pretermination hearing "nothing more than sham process paying lip service to federal
law." Id. at 652.
103. See, e.g., Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989); Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709 (5th Cir.

1987).
104. Duchesne, 849 F.2d at 1008.
105. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
106. A second argument against the employee's bias claim improperly applies the immunity standard under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). In Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527
(1981), overruled on other grounds, Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), the
Supreme Court held that liability under § 1983 did not lie for negligent deprivation of
property where state law provided an adequate post-deprivation damage remedy. See
Parratt,451 U.S. at 543; cf.Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986) (due process
not implicated for negligent acts regardless of availability of post-deprivation remedy).
Later, in Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), the Court extended the Parrattrule to
intentional deprivations of property that result from random and unauthorized conduct
of state actors. See id. at 529-30. Under this analysis, the existence of post-termination
process is adequate because the presence of bias is random and unauthorized. See
Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1987); Crocker v. Fluvanna
County Bd. of Pub. Welfare, 676 F. Supp. 711, 717 (W.D. Va. 1988), aff'd, 859 F.2d 14
(4th Cir. 1988).
However, the rule stated in Parrattand Daniels does not apply to public officials authorized to terminate employees. Their acts are indeed authorized and deliberate; moreover, decisionmakers in employment termination cases are high-ranking public officials.
As policymakers themselves, their acts are policy decisions subject to scrutiny under
§ 1983. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480-84 (1986). Therefore, the
availability of a post-deprivation hearing does not cure the deprivation of a fair
pretermination hearing. See Salisbury v. Housing Auth., 615 F. Supp. 1433, 1442 n.9

(E.D. Ky. 1985).
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CONCLUSION

Pretermination hearings under the due process clause provide an initial check against erroneous termination. The objective is to prevent the
employee from unnecessary interruption of his primary source of income
and the serious hardship that may result. Decisionmakers who participate substantially in the termination decision or who have other conflicts
of interest are impermissibly biased against the employee. To preserve
the public employee's due process rights, such decisionmakers should not
be permitted to conduct pretermination hearings.
Robert F Maslan, Jr.

